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ABSTRACT
Deep learning is a machine learning technique that enables computers to learn directly from
images, text, or sound in the same way that people do. It is a key technology which enables self-
driving cars and speech recognition. In the past few years, deep learning has been successfully
used in a wide range of applications and has demonstrated results beyond what computers were
thought to be capable of. This new technology is poised to change the way we live.
Despite the successes, the exact working of deep learning models is not well-understood, and
they can fail in several unintuitive ways. One such vulnerability is that small modifications to the
input, which might not even be noticeable for humans, are enough to fool these models. This
vulnerability has received significant attention from the research community and is a well-studied
problem. Our focus is the scenario where the parameters of the model, rather than its inputs, are
maliciously modified.
Deep learning models contain a large number of parameters that interact with each other in
complex ways, so small perturbations to a large number of parameters can produce a cumulative
effect, causing the model to misbehave. Further, noise inherent in practical systems can act as a
camouflage for such malicious perturbations, making it difficult to detect them.
Even though deep learning models have produced amazing results, their vulnerabilities present
a serious concern that must be overcome before they can be deployed in practical systems. In this
work, we evaluate the threat of attackers maliciously modifying the model parameters to compro-
mise the model. We demonstrate that small perturbations to the parameters are enough to compro-
mise the model without significantly affecting its performance. We also study the characteristics
of these malicious perturbations and devise a strategy to detect such an attack.
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1. INTRODUCTION
In 2012, Alex Krizhevesky and his group used deep neural networks to win the ImageNet Large
Scale Visual Recognition Challenge (ILSVRC) [2]. In the object classification competition, they
nearly halved the top-5 error rate compared to other teams who were using traditional approaches.
Their extraordinary performance gained a lot of attention, and since then, deep neural networks
have demonstrated impressive results in a wide range of applications. They have surpassed humans
in object recognition [3] and produced state of the art results in machine translation [4, 5, 6] and
speech recognition [7].
Deep neural networks have been incorporated into Google Translate, resulting in fluent sen-
tences that are easier to read and understand [8]. Most major companies including Amazon, Ap-
ple, Google, and Microsoft now use deep neural networks in their speech recognition systems
[9, 10, 11, 12]. Deep learning models have also been used for medical applications like discover-
ing new drugs [13] and diagnosing skin cancer [14] as well as autism [15]. They have been used
to beat the World Champion Go player [16] and mastered a number of other games [17, 18]. They
have also been used to create realistic images [19] and artworks [20] as well as compose music
[21].
Despite the widespread use of deep learning models in a diverse set of fields, research suggests
that they are vulnerable to attacks in several unintuitive ways. One such vulnerability is that small
perturbations added to the input, which might not even be noticeable for humans, are enough to
fool the model. Further, the adversarial inputs can be designed so that the models have a high
confidence in their incorrect prediction [1, 22, 23].
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Figure 1.1: A panda misclassified as a gibbon using FGSM [1] (Reprinted from [1])
We refer to this as the data attack since the model’s input is being maliciously modified to
fool the model. The data attack requires the addition of carefully crafted perturbations, which do
not occur naturally. So, the threat posed by this type of an attack is limited to applications where
the input is readily available to be modified and is not as severe for real-time applications like the
self-driving car where the input is obtained directly from the real world. For such applications,
modifying the parameters of the deployed model is a more effective attack strategy.
The way deep neural networks decide their classifications is not well-understood. Also, these
models typically have a huge number of parameters that interact with each other in complex ways,
so small perturbations to a large number of parameters can produce a cumulative effect, causing
the model to misbehave. Noise inherent in practical systems can act as a camouflage for such
malicious perturbations, making it difficult to detect such an attack. We refer to this as the model
attack, and the goal of the model attack is to compromise the model by modifying its parameters.
Our goal is to study the threat posed by the model attack and find ways to mitigate the risk. The
rest of the thesis is organized as follows: Chapter 2 summarizes the previous research on the model
attack problem as well as the data attack problem. Chapter 3 formally defines the model attack
problem. In Chapter 4, we describe our strategy to carry out the model attack and demonstrate
that the model attack can be carried out without being easily detected. In Chapter 5, we examine
the bit errors introduced due to the model attack and analyze the model-attack noise values using
strip plots. Chapter 6 describes our strategy to detect the model attack. Chapter 7 describes our
attempt to devise a strategy to detect the model attack by visualizing the noise values using t-SNE
2
[24]. In Chapter 8, we compare the model’s predictions before and after the attack with the goal of
understanding how the model attack affects the model’s performance. We conclude the thesis and
provide suggestions for future work in Chapter 9.
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2. RELATED WORK
In this chapter, we discuss previous attempts to carry out the model attack and explain how our
research relates to them. We view the model attack problem as the dual of the data attack problem,
so we also review the existing research on the data attack.
2.1 Prior efforts to carry out the model attack
There has been some recent research focusing on the model attack problem. Several researchers
have demonstrated that a model’s classification ability can be compromised by perturbing its pa-
rameters.
 Liu et al. argue that fault injection attacks can be carried out on SRAMs to precisely mod-
ify any of the DNN weights stored in memory. They propose the Gradient Descent attack
which causes the model to misclassify a given input pattern while minimizing the number of
weights modified. They minimize the number of faults required to be injected by ignoring
the modifications which are close to zero [25].
 Rakin et al. propose a strategy to identify the most vulnerable bits in the neural network.
They demonstrate that flipping a small number of these bits can cause a large deterioration
in performance [26].
 Qin et al. store weights as arrays of bits and each bit is flipped independently with a given
probability. They examine how the probability of errors affects the model’s performance.
[27].
 Arechiga et al. introduce errors in the weight values using random bit flips and evaluate
the performance of the network. They conclude that Multilayer Perceptrons are more robust
than CNNs and that CNNs with larger kernels are more robust than those with smaller kernels
[28].
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All of the research mentioned above focuses on the security aspects of models implemented in
conventional memories like the SRAMs.
2.2 Limitation of conventional systems and in-memory computing
Conventional systems use the von-Neumann architecture, so the data is stored separate from the
processor. This necessitates the back and forth transfer of data between the processor and memory.
This movement of data is time-consuming and energy-intensive, which limits the performance of
these systems.
This limitation is unavoidable in conventional systems, which makes them unsuitable for ap-
plications using Internet of things (IoT) and machine learning, which are data-intensive, and yet,
are required to be fast and energy-efficient. In order to make these applications practical, we need
to avoid the overhead of transferring data from memory to the processor. For this purpose, novel
memory systems, capable of performing matrix operations in-memory, are proposed.
Memristor is one such device, and it has been demonstrated to be more energy-efficient than
CMOS devices. The resistance of a memristive device is determined by the amount of charge
that has flowed through it, so its value can be varied by controlling the current flowing through
the device. This property makes these devices well-suited to represent the trainable weights in a
neural network. Further, the integrate and fire operation of the synapse is easily realizable using
memristors making them a good choice to implement neural networks [29, 30]. Phase Change
Memories (PCMs) also offer promise for neural network computations [31]. The different phases
of the cells have different resistivities, and these provide stable resistance levels to store the weight
values. These weights can be tuned in-situ during the learning process by adjusting the amount of
heat applied to the cells. Research suggests that using these devices to implement neural networks
will result in significant gains in speed and energy efficiency [32, 33]. In addition to being fast
and energy-efficient, these devices are small and non-volatile, which makes them well-suited to
store the large number of weights contained in a DNN. We envision that these devices will be
instrumental while implementing DNNs in hardware.
Even though these devices have several useful properties, there is an inherent problem of noise
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associated with them [34]. This means that a system, which uses these devices, will perceive
at least some noise even during normal operation. This noise can provide a camouflage for the
attackers’ perturbations to the model parameters, allowing them to compromise the model while
the system only perceives an acceptable level of noise. Our work focuses on the possible security
implications when DNN models are implemented using these devices.
2.3 Recently proposed strategy to detect the model attack
Recently, He et al. proposed a strategy to enable customers serving their models through cloud
providers to verify the integrity of their deployed models. Since the actual parameters values
are not easily available in this scenario, they propose a method to detect changes in the model
parameters by means of specially crafted inputs. These inputs are designed so that any changes
in the model’s parameters will cause its prediction for the inputs to change [35]. Their strategy is
effective in detecting changes to the model parameters; however, it is not suitable for detecting an
attack in the scenario where the model parameters always contain some noise.
2.4 The data attack problem
A significant amount of research effort has gone into understanding the data attack problem and
several strategies have been proposed to carry out the data attack. Goodfellow et al. hypothesize
that the cause for adversarial examples is the linearity of the models. Based on this hypothesis,
they propose the Fast-Gradient Sign Method which tries to maximize the change in the loss value
by adding perturbations of magnitude  to the pixels of the image [1]. This allows them to create a
simple but effective strategy for generating adversarial examples.
x0 = x+ sign(rxJ(; x; y))
where x is original image and x0 is the adversarial image,
y is the model’s label for x,
 represents the model parameters and
J(; x; y) is the cost function used to train the model.
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Szegedy et al. formulate the problem of finding adversarial inputs as follows [22]:
minimize kx  x0k+ lossF;l(x0) s:t x0  [0; 1]n (2.1)
where x is the original image,
l is the desired incorrect label,
F is the trained neural network,
lossF;l(x
0) is the negative log probability (cross entropy) that the model assigns a label l to x0.
By minimizing kx  x0k + lossF;l(x0), they find x0, the closest image to x which is most likely to
be misclassified as l by the network. Carlini et al. build on this approach by reformulating the box
constraint in Eqn. 2.1 using the hyperbolic tangent function. This allows them to devise a more
robust attack strategy using the Adam optimizer [23].
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3. THE MODEL ATTACK PROBLEM
The model attack aims to compromise the model’s classification ability without alerting the
system. In this chapter, we identify an objective for the model attack and formally define the
problem.
3.1 Objective of the model attack
Before we can define the problem, we need to identify the objective of the model attack. The
data attack involves perturbing the input image so that the model is unable to classify it correctly. In
the case of the model attack, instead of the input image, the parameters of the model are perturbed.
So, the model attack problem can be viewed as the dual of the data attack problem. We use this
observation to define the goal of the model attack as causing the model to misclassify a given input.
3.2 Problem Definition
We have defined the objective of the model attack as causing the model to classify a specific
input with a specific incorrect label. However, simply meeting this objective is not enough for a
successful attack. If the attack results in a significant change in the performance of the model or if
the added perturbations are too large, then the system is likely to become aware of the attack and
decide to reload the original weights, causing the model attack to fail. So, for a successful attack,
we require that the added perturbations and the resulting change in model performance are small
enough so that the system is unable to detect the attack.
We evaluate the change in the model’s performance by comparing its accuracy on the test
set before and after the attack. For the magnitude of the perturbations, we evaluate the SNR
(Signal to Noise Ratio) of the weights considering their original values as the signal and the added
perturbations as the noise.





n be the corresponding weights in the compromised DNN.
Then wi is the signal value, and w0i   wi is the corresponding noise value.
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Since NoisePower is also equal to the MSE (Mean Square Error) of the weights, we can also




For a given model, the power of the signal is fixed, so the SNR only depends on the magnitude
of the added perturbations. The means that minimizing the MSE value in the weights leads to a
high SNR value.
Considering the objective of the model attack and the fact that the attack must minimize the
noise added to the model parameters, we can formulate the model attack problem as follows:
minimize kW  W 0k s:t C(W 0; x) = l (3.1)
where x is the target image which is to be misclassified,
W is the set of initial parameter values,
W 0 is the set of modified parameters,
C represents the model’s predictions for a given set of parameter values and input, and
l is the desired incorrect label.
In the above formulation, C(W;x) = l is a highly discrete mapping, which makes the problem
very hard to solve. So, we approximate the problem by substituting this mapping with the loss
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function and solve the following problem instead:
minimize kW  W 0k+   cross_entropyF;l;x(W 0) (3.2)
where F represents all aspects of the neural network model except its parameter values,
 > 0 is a constant and
cross_entropyF;l;x is the negative log probability that the model represented by F assigns a label
l to x.
Equation 3.2 is our formulation for the model attack problem, and it explicitly satisfies our
goal of causing the model to misclassify a given image with minimal perturbations. We observe
that solving this problem also minimizes the change in the model’s performance, and this has been
verified empirically in the subsequent chapters.
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4. EFFECTIVENESS OF THE MODEL ATTACK
In this chapter, we demonstrate that the model attack can be carried out in a way that is not
easily detectable. We describe a strategy to carry out the model attack and show that the model can
be compromised with negligible changes in the model’s performance and weight values.
4.1 Our Approach
We choose one image from the training set as the target image which is to be misclassified.
Then, we create two datasets from the training set; the first contains all of the examples in the
training set except the target image while the second contains only one example, which is the
target image with its label changed to the desired incorrect value. We use the first dataset, which
contains only correctly labeled examples, to train the initial model. Then, we carry out the model
attack on this model by retraining it on the second dataset. Below we describe our initial attempt
to carry out the model attack and then explain how overcoming its limitations led us to our “Loss
Function based model attack” strategy.
4.1.1 Initial Attempt
Our initial attempt involved retraining the initial model on the second dataset to learn the in-
correct classification. This strategy was successful in causing the model to misclassify the target
image with only a small drop in its test set accuracy; however, it caused a large drop in the SNR
value of the model parameters. Hence, our initial attempt was not successful.
4.1.2 Loss Function Based Model Attack
The failure of our initial attempt can be attributed to the fact that it had no incentive to minimize
the changes in the weight values during the retraining process. The loss value used during the
retraining process only included a single cross entropy term to learn the desired incorrect label
for the target image. Due to this, the retraining resulted in large changes in the parameter values,
causing the SNR value to deteriorate significantly. In order to overcome this, we modified the loss
11
value used during the retraining phase to include the MSE values of the weights along with the
cross entropy term. The MSE values represent the magnitude of the changes in the weight values,
so minimizing the loss value also minimizes the perturbations. Using this approach, which we
refer to as the Loss-function based model attack, we were able to successfully carry out a model
attack with minimal drop in performance and SNR values.
The strategy involves retraining the initial model on the second dataset using the modified loss
function which is seen below:
(4.1)loss = k1  cross_entropy + k2 
PN
n=1(MSEweightsln +MSEbiasesln)
where k1 and k2 are constants,
cross_entropy is the negative log probability that the model assigns the desired label to the target
image,
N is the number of layers in the CNN,
MSEweightsln andMSEbiasesln are the MSE values for the weights and biases in layer n.
4.2 Performance Evaluation
We evaluate the performance of our strategy on CNNs trained on the MNIST and CIFAR-10
datasets. The steps undertaken are as follows:
1. Choose a target image from the training set and create the two datasets as described earlier.
2. Use the correctly labeled dataset to train the model.
3. Measure the model’s test set accuracy and confidences for the target image. These are the
values for the model before the attack.
4. Record the model weights; these are required to compute the SNR value after the attack.
5. Retrain the model for 100 epochs with the second dataset using the modified loss function
as described earlier.
6. Measure the model’s test set accuracy and confidences for the target image again. These are
the values for the model after the attack.
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7. Record the model weights and compute the SNR value by comparing them with the original
weights recorded in step 4.
Tables 4.1-4.10 provide the model’s test set accuracy and confidences for the target image before
and after the attack, along with the SNR values for each layer in the model after the attack. From the
model’s confidence values, it is seen that the model’s prediction for the target image has changed.
It is also seen that the model’s accuracy on the test set is not significantly affected as a result of the
attack. Further, from the high SNR values, we can infer that the magnitude of the added noise is
negligible compared to the actual weight values.
4.2.1 MNIST dataset
We used a 5 layer CNN for MNIST. It contained 3 convolutional layers followed by a dense
layer and a softmax layer. The following loss function was optimized during the retraining phase:
loss = 4  cross_entropy + 1e7
 (mseWconv1 +mseWconv2 +mseWconv3 +mseWdense+mseWout
+mseBiasconv1+mseBiasconv2+mseBiasconv3+mseBiasdense+mseBiasout)
(4.2)
Tables 4.1-4.5 contain the results corresponding to attacks on models trained on the MNIST
dataset.
4.2.2 CIFAR-10 dataset
We used a 7 layer CNN for CIFAR-10. It contained 5 convolutional layers followed by a dense
layer and a softmax layer. The following loss function was optimized during retraining:
loss = 10  cross_entropy + 1e7
 (mseWconv1 +mseWconv2 +mseWconv3 +mseWdense+mseWout
+mseBiasconv1+mseBiasconv2+mseBiasconv3+mseBiasdense+mseBiasout)
(4.3)
Tables 4.6-4.10 contain the results of attacks on models trained on the CIFAR-10 dataset.
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Test Set Accuracy 0.9896 0.9891
SNR values for all five layers after the attack
snrWeights 6.9e07 5.8e05 4.4e04 1.3e04 5.1e06
snrBiases 5.2e07 1.0e08 5.7e07 3.8e07 2.1e08
Table 4.1: The table shows the change in test set accuracy, model confidences, and SNR as a result of causing the
model to misclassify an image of a “5”(seen above) as a “3”
























Test Set Accuracy 0.9903 0.9880
SNR values for all five layers after the attack
snrWeights 7.6e07 5.4e05 2.3e04 6.9e03 3.8e06
snrBiases 1.1e07 1.2e08 5.6e07 4.2e07 3.2e07
Table 4.2: The table shows the change in test set accuracy, model confidences, and SNR as a result of causing the
model to misclassify an image of a “4”(seen above) as a “7”
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Test Set Accuracy 0.9887 0.9859
SNR values for all five layers after the attack
snrWeights 1.5e07 1.7e05 1.2e04 6.8e03 3.2e06
snrBiases 5.1e07 8.5e07 8.6e07 3.0e07 1.3e08
Table 4.3: The table shows the change in test set accuracy, model confidences, and SNR as a result of a model attack
causing the model to misclassify an image of a “2”(seen above) as a “3”
























Test Set Accuracy 0.9885 0.9874
SNR values for all five layers after the attack
snrWeights 1.8e07 1.4e05 8.5e03 5.8e03 2.3e06
snrBiases 2.3e07 8.3e07 6.1e07 3.3e07 7.2e07
Table 4.4: The table shows the change in test set accuracy, model confidences, and SNR as a result of causing the
model to misclassify an image of a “3”(seen above) as a “9”
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Test Set Accuracy 0.9874 0.9768
SNR values for all five layers after the attack
snrWeights 3.1e07 4.4e05 1.5e04 7.9e03 4.3e06
snrBiases 3.2e07 1.0e08 9.0e07 4.6e07 6.6e07
Table 4.5: The table shows the change in test set accuracy, model confidences, and SNR as a result of causing the
model to misclassify an image of a “5”(seen above) as a “8”
























Test Set Accuracy 0.8144 0.8127
SNR values for all seven layers after the attack
snrWeights 3.5e05 1.3e05 2.3e05 9.0e04 4.6e04 1.8e04 1.7e06
snrBiases 8.8e06 5.0e06 4.3e07 2.6e08 3.4e08 2.3e09 4.3e09
Table 4.6: The table shows the change in test set accuracy, model confidences, and SNR as a result of causing the
model to misclassify an image of a “truck”(seen above) as an “airplane”
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Test Set Accuracy 0.8104 0.8009
SNR values for all seven layers after the attack
snrWeights 2.4e05 1.3e05 2.4e05 1.4e05 5.5e04 1.6e04 3.4e06
snrBiases 1.1e06 1.2e06 5.7e06 3.0e07 5.7e07 1.4e09 2.7e09
Table 4.7: The table shows the change in test set accuracy, model confidences, and SNR as a result of causing the
model to misclassify an image of a “frog”(seen above) as a “truck”
























Test Set Accuracy 0.8015 0.8005
SNR values for all seven layers after the attack
snrWeights 3.0e05 1.8e05 3.8e05 1.8e05 8.0e04 1.6e04 4.2e06
snrBiases 7.9e06 3.2e06 6.1e07 1.5e08 1.5e08 1.7e09 2.6e09
Table 4.8: The table shows the change in test set accuracy, model confidences, and SNR as a result of causing the
model to misclassify an image of a “bird”(seen above) as a “ship”
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Test Set Accuracy 0.8155 0.8173
SNR values for all seven layers after the attack
snrWeights 5.7e05 7.0e04 1.6e05 8.9e04 4.7e04 2.2e04 8.4e06
snrBiases 9.1e06 2.5e06 2.6e07 3.2e08 5.9e08 5.5e09 6.7e09
Table 4.9: The table shows the change in test set accuracy, model confidences, and SNR as a result of causing the
model to misclassify an image of an “automobile”(seen above) as a “frog”
























Test Set Accuracy 0.8092 0.8036
SNR values for all seven layers after the attack
snrWeights 2.8e05 2.0e05 3.2e05 1.6e05 4.5e04 1.4e04 1.0e06
snrBiases 4.2e06 5.8e06 3.7e07 2.7e08 3.4e08 3.0e09 3.8e09
Table 4.10: The table shows the change in test set accuracy, model confidences, and SNR as a result of causing the
model to misclassify an image of a “deer”(seen above) as a “cat”
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5. PROPERTIES OF MODEL-ATTACK NOISE
In the previous chapter, we have demonstrated our strategy for the model attack. It changes the
model parameters in minimal ways to compromise the CNN. These modifications can be treated
as noise introduced due to the model attack, and if we can detect this model-attack noise in the
presence of random noise, then we will have a way to detect the model attack. In this chapter, we
compare the properties of the model-attack noise with those of Gaussian random noise. Specif-
ically, we examine the BER (Bit Error Rates) in the model weights and the distribution of the
model-attack noise values.
5.1 Bit Error Rates (BER)
BER values are used to evaluate the performance of a communication system. They represent
the probability that the received bit is different from what was transmitted. We consider the model-
attack noise as analogous to the noise that occurs during transmission, the original weights as the
transmitted signal, and the modified weights as the received signal. We then compute the BER
value by comparing the original weights and the modified weights.
We convert all the weight values into their binary representations and compare each of the
bits in the original weights with the corresponding bits in the modified weights. The number of
mismatches among the bits gives us the number of bit errors, which we divide by the total number
of bits to compute the BER values. We do this for every bit position and record the corresponding
BER values.
Figures 5.1-5.10 show the BER values for the various bit positions due to the presence of
model-attack noise. Since we represent the weight values with a 12 bit resolution, the x-axis
in each of the plots contains 12 values corresponding to the 12 bit positions. The BER values
corresponding to the different layers in the CNN model have been shown separately in the figures.
It is seen that the BER values for the most significant bit position are always the least, and the
values steadily increase as we move towards the least significant bit position. This is same as
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what can be expected from Gaussian random noise, so BERs do not offer a way for us to detect
model-attack noise in the presence of Gaussian random noise.
Figure 5.1: BER values for model-attack noise produced when a model was compromised to misclassify an image of a
“5” as a “3”. The BER value is lowest for the most significant bit and steadily increases as we move to less significant
bit positions.
Figure 5.2: BER values for model-attack noise produced when a model was compromised to misclassify an image of
a “2” as a “3”.
5.2 Distribution of model-attack noise
In the previous section, we observed that the BER values due to model-attack noise are very
similar to what can be expected due to Gaussian random noise. Next, we compare model-attack
noise with Gaussian random noise of comparable mean and variance. We use the mean and stan-
dard deviation for the model-attack noise in each layer of the CNN and use these to generate the
corresponding Gaussian noise. We then visualize all the noise values using strip plots. In Figures
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Figure 5.3: BER values for model-attack noise produced when a model was compromised to misclassify an image of
a “4” as a “7”.
Figure 5.4: BER values for model-attack noise produced when a model was compromised to misclassify an image of
a “5” as a “8”.
Figure 5.5: BER values for model-attack noise produced when a model was compromised to misclassify an image of
a “3” as a “9”.
Figure 5.6: BER values for model-attack noise produced when a model was compromised to misclassify an image of
a “bird” as a “ship”.
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Figure 5.7: BER values for model-attack noise produced when a model was compromised to misclassify an image of
an “automobile” as a “frog”.
Figure 5.8: BER values for model-attack noise produced when a model was compromised to misclassify an image of
a “deer” as a “cat”.
Figure 5.9: BER values for model-attack noise produced when a model was compromised to misclassify an image of
a “frog” as a “truck”.
Figure 5.10: BER values for model-attack noise produced when a model was compromised to misclassify an image of
a “truck” as an “airplane”.
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5.11-5.20, the strip plots on the left correspond to model-attack noise and those on the right cor-
respond to Gaussian noise. The strips in the plots contain the noise values corresponding to the
different layers in the CNN, and the x-axis indicates the layer of the CNN corresponding to the
strip. It is seen that the model-attack noise is more concentrated around 0 and has a larger spread
of values when compared to Gaussian noise.
Figure 5.11: The model-attack noise values produced when a model was compromised to misclassify an image of a
“5” as a “3”, along with the corresponding Gaussian noise values.
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Figure 5.12: The model-attack noise values produced when a model was compromised to misclassify an image of a
“2” as a “3”, along with the corresponding Gaussian noise values.
Figure 5.13: The model-attack noise values produced when a model was compromised to misclassify an image of a
“4” as a “7”, along with the corresponding Gaussian noise values.
Figure 5.14: The model-attack noise values produced when a model was compromised to misclassify an image of a
“5” as a “8”, along with the corresponding Gaussian noise values.
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Figure 5.15: The model-attack noise values produced when a model was compromised to misclassify an image of a
“3” as a “9”, along with the corresponding Gaussian noise values.
Figure 5.16: The model-attack noise values produced when a model was compromised to misclassify an image of a
“bird” as a “ship”, along with the corresponding Gaussian noise values.
Figure 5.17: The model-attack noise values produced when a model was compromised to misclassify an image of an
“automobile” as a “frog”, along with the corresponding Gaussian noise values.
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Figure 5.18: The model-attack noise values produced when a model was compromised to misclassify an image of a
“deer” as a “cat”, along with the corresponding Gaussian noise values.
Figure 5.19: The model-attack noise values produced when a model was compromised to misclassify an image of a
“frog” as a “truck”, along with the corresponding Gaussian noise values.
Figure 5.20: The model-attack noise values produced when a model was compromised to misclassify an image of a
“truck” as an “airplane”, along with the corresponding Gaussian noise values.
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6. A STRATEGY TO DETECT THE MODEL ATTACK
In the last chapter, we observed that model-attack noise values are more concentrated around
zero and have a larger range when compared to Gaussian random noise with comparable mean and
standard deviation. Since the noise in the real world can be modeled using a Gaussian distribution,
these distinguishing characteristics of the model-attack noise can help us detect the model attack
in the presence of random noise. In this chapter, we devise a strategy to detect the model attack
based on this observation and evaluate its effectiveness.
6.1 Kurtosis
Kurtosis is a measure of peakedness and tailedness of a distribution. In other words, it quanti-
fies the sharpness of the peak of the distribution and the likelihood that the samples drawn from it
belong to the its tails. Kurtosis is defined as the standardized fourth population moment about the
mean [36] and can be represented mathematically as shown below.
2 =
E(X   )4
(E(X   )2)2 =
m4
4
where E is the expectation operator,
 is the mean,
m4 is the fourth moment about the mean, and
 is the standard deviation.
Replacing the values in the above equation with their sample equivalents allows us to estimate the







where b2 is the sample kurtosis,
X is the sample mean, and
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n is the number of observations.
The normal distribution has a kurtosis of 3, and we use this observation to detect the presence of
model-attack noise.
6.2 Our Strategy
We choose kurtosis as the basis for our strategy since the model-attack noise values are heavily
concentrated near the mean and have a larger range compared to Gaussian noise with the same
variance. Kurtosis, being a measure of the peakedness and tailedness, quantifies exactly these
characteristics. We measure the sample kurtosis, b2, for the noise values in the model parameters
and compare it with 3, the expected value for a normal distribution. If the difference is too large,
we conclude that model-attack noise is present.
6.3 Experiments
Practical devices contain non-idealities and noise is inevitable, and attackers can use this noise
as camouflage for their malicious perturbations to the model parameters. We model these non-
idealities as Gaussian random noise present in the model parameters. We combine Gaussian noise
with noise generated due to the model attack to simulate noise in the scenario where the model
has been compromised. We then evaluate whether our strategy is able to detect the presence of
model-attack noise.
We carry out the model attack using the Loss function based model attack strategy as described
in Chapter 4 and record the generated model-attack noise values. Then, we generate Gaussian
noise values with a wide range of variance values. From these, we create samples containing both
model-attack noise and Gaussian noise as well as samples containing only Gaussian noise. We
compute the kurtosis values for these samples and show their variation with respect to the variance
of the Gaussian noise in Figures 6.1-6.6.
We see that a threshold of 3.04 for the kurtosis value separates the samples containing model-
attack noise from those containing only Gaussian random noise. We also notice that there exists
a maximum variance value beyond which the strategy is unable to distinguish the samples that
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contain model-attack noise from those that do not. We refer to this as the maximum tolerable noise
variance for our strategy, and beyond this value, the strategy becomes ineffective. We find that this
value is around 1e-05 for the examples we consider.
Figure 6.1: The model-attack noise was generated as a result of causing a model to misclassify an image of a “5” as a
“3”, and has a variance of 1.5e-07. It is seen that maximum tolerable noise variance is 4e-06.
Figure 6.2: The model-attack noise was generated as a result of causing a model to misclassify an image of a “4” as a
“7”, and has a variance of 2.93e-07. It is seen that the maximum tolerable noise variance is 1e-05.
For our strategy to be effective, we need it to reliably detect model-attack noise when it is
present and also indicate that it is absent when only Gaussian random noise is present. The errors
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Figure 6.3: The model-attack noise used here has a variance of 4.19e-07, and was generated as a result of causing a
model to misclassify an image of a “2” as a “3”. It is seen that the maximum tolerable noise variance is 1e-5.
Figure 6.4: The model-attack noise used here has a variance of 3.93e-07, and was generated as a result of causing a
model to misclassify an image of a “automobile” as a “frog”. It is seen that the maximum tolerable noise variance is
2e-5.
Figure 6.5: The model-attack noise used here has a variance of 4.23e-07, and was generated as a result of causing a
model to misclassify an image of a “bird” as a “ship”. It is seen that the maximum tolerable noise variance is 4e-5.
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Figure 6.6: The model-attack noise used here has a variance of 4.32e-07, and was generated as a result of causing a
model to misclassify an image of a “truck” as a “airplane”. It is seen that the maximum tolerable noise variance is
4e-5.
where the strategy fails to detect the model-attack noise even though it is present are referred to as
false negatives. False positives occur when the strategy indicates that model-attack noise is present
when it isn’t. So, to evaluate the effectiveness of our strategy, we need to check the rate of false
positives and false negatives.
If a noise sample containing model-attack noise has a kurtosis value that is lower than the
threshold, then it is a false negative. To evaluate the false negative rate, we create noise samples
containing both Gaussian random noise and model-attack noise and check how frequently the
strategy produces a wrong “negative” result. Tables 6.1-6.4 show the variance of the Gaussian
noise and kurtosis values for samples containing both Gaussian noise and model-attack noise. We
see that the strategy produces the correct “positive” result for samples with low variance while
higher variance values result in false negatives.
In addition to false negatives, we also need to evaluate the rate of false positives. If a sample
containing only Gaussian noise has a kurtosis value greater than the threshold, then it is a false
positive. So, to evaluate the false positive rate, we repeatedly generate samples containing only
Gaussian random noise and check how frequently the strategy produces a wrong “positive” result.
We generate two sets of samples containing Gaussian noise corresponding to the model architec-
tures used for MNIST and CIFAR-10. Tables 6.5 and 6.6 show the variance of the Gaussian noise
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Table 6.1: The table shows the kurtosis values for Gaussian noise samples that also contain model-attack noise. The
model-attack noise used here was generated as the result of compromising a model to misclassify an image of a “5” as
a “3”.
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Table 6.2: The table shows the kurtosis values for Gaussian noise samples that also contain model-attack noise. The
model-attack noise used here was generated as the result of compromising a model to misclassify an image of a “4” as
a “7”.
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Table 6.3: The table shows the kurtosis values for Gaussian noise samples that also contain model-attack noise. The
model-attack noise used here was generated as the result of compromising a model to misclassify an image of an
“automobile” as a “frog”.
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Table 6.4: The table shows the kurtosis values for Gaussian noise samples that also contain model-attack noise. The
model-attack noise used here was generated as the result of compromising a model to misclassify an image of a “bird”
as a “ship”.
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and kurtosis values for these samples. It is seen that there are virtually no false positives.























Table 6.5: Evaluating false positives using Gaussian noise samples generated based on the model architecture used for
MNIST
We observe that the strategy effectively detects the samples containing model-attack noise only
when the Gaussian noise has low variance. This is because the distinguishing features of the model-
attack noise i.e. the large concentration of values near zero and higher range become less apparent
from the distribution as the variance of the Gaussian noise increases.
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Table 6.6: Evaluating false positives using Gaussian noise samples generated based on the model architecture used for
CIFAR-10
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7. VISUALIZING THE MODEL-ATTACK NOISE IN THE CONVOLUTIONAL LAYERS
In the previous chapter, we devised a strategy to detect the model attack based on the noise
distribution. This strategy is effective only when the variance of the Gaussian random noise present
in the model parameters is low. In this chapter, we visualize the model-attack noise values with
the goal of identifying characteristics which can enable us to devise a more effective strategy for
detecting the model attack.
Our model architecture is based on VGG [37], and the weight values in the convolutional layers
are contained in 3*3 kernels of varying depths. The model attack adds noise to each of these weight
values, so the model-attack noise in these kernels can be represented as a 3*3 matrix which has the
same depth as the kernel. We split this 3D matrix into several 3*3 matrices, which we then convert
into 9*1 vectors. We visualize these vectors in 2D using t-SNE [24]. This process is illustrated in
Figure 7.1.
Figure 7.1: The process of converting model-attack noise values into 2D
The t-SNE plots for the model-attack noise generated using the process described above are
seen in Figures 7.3-7.6. The colors of the points in these figures correspond to the layers in the
CNN to which they belong. We also plot a t-SNE visualization of 3*3 matrices containing Gaussian
noise values in Figure 7.2. Observing the t-SNE plots, we see that the model-attack noise has more
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structure than Gaussian noise. In the t-SNE plots for model-attack noise, the points corresponding
to the various layers are close to each other and form clusters. There also exists an oval cluster,
which is distinct from the rest of the points. The points in this cluster correspond to 3*3 matrices
of model-attack noise values that are either zero or very close to zero.
Figure 7.2: t-SNE plot for 9*1 vectors of Gaussian random noise.
Figure 7.3: t-SNE plot for the model-attack noise produced as a result of compromising a model to misclassify an
image of a “4” as a “7”.
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Figure 7.4: t-SNE plot for the model-attack noise produced as a result of compromising a model to misclassify an
image of a “3” as a “9”.
Figure 7.5: t-SNE plot for the model-attack noise produced as a result of compromising a model to misclassify an
image of a “deer” as a “cat”.
Figure 7.6: t-SNE plot for the model-attack noise produced as a result of compromising a model to misclassify an
image of an “automobile” as a “frog”.
40
Next, we check if the structures identified by t-SNE still exist in the presence of random noise
since this would enable us to detect the model attack. Figures 7.7-7.10 show the t-SNE plots for
model-attack noise in the presence of Gaussian random noise with varying variance values. We
see that the presence of Gaussian noise causes much of the structure in the model-attack noise to
disappear. The structures become progressively harder to detect as the variance of Gaussian noise
increases. When the variance of the Gaussian noise is around 1e-06, the t-SNE plot looks very
similar to the t-SNE plot for Gaussian random noise, with no noticeable structure in it. This means
that even though the strategy is effective in differentiating model-attack noise from Gaussian noise,
it is not suitable for detecting model-attack noise in the presence of random noise.
Figure 7.7: t-SNE plot for model-attack noise in the presence of Gaussian random noise with variance V. The model-
attack noise visualized here was produced as a result of compromising a model to misclassify an image of a “4” as a
“7”.
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Figure 7.8: t-SNE plot for model-attack noise in the presence of Gaussian random noise with variance V. The model-
attack noise visualized here was produced as a result of compromising a model to misclassify an image of a “3” as a
“9”.
Figure 7.9: t-SNE plot for model-attack noise in the presence of Gaussian random noise with variance V. The model-
attack noise visualized here was produced as a result of compromising a model to misclassify an image of a “deer” as
a “cat”.
Figure 7.10: t-SNE plot for model-attack noise in the presence of Gaussian random noise with variance V. The model-
attack noise visualized here was produced as a result of compromising a model to misclassify an image of an “auto-
mobile” as a “frog”.
42
8. ANALYZING THE MODEL’S PREDICTIONS BEFORE AND AFTER THE ATTACK
We have seen that the Loss function based model attack does not significantly change the
model’s test set accuracy. However, this does not mean that all of the model’s predictions remain
unchanged. Analyzing how the model’s predictions change due to the attack might help us uncover
patterns, enabling us to detect the model attack. In this chapter, we visualize the images in the
dataset using t-SNE and observe how the attack affects the model’s predictions.
We record the model’s initial predictions for the various images in the training set. Then, we
embed the training set images into a 2D plot using t-SNE and assign colors to the points in the
plot based on the model’s predictions for the corresponding images. After this, we carry out the
model attack and then generate a new plot using the same t-SNE embedding as before but using
the model’s predictions after the attack to decide the colors of the points. Figures 8.2, 8.3, 8.5 and
8.6 show the plots corresponding to model attacks carried out on models trained on MNIST and
CIFAR-10.
From the plots, it is seen that the model’s predictions for most of the images remain unchanged,
and there are no clear patterns which can help us detect the model attack. This also shows that the
our attack strategy meets the requirement that the model’s performance is not significantly changed
due to the attack.
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Figure 8.1: The images in the MNIST training set have been visualized using t-SNE. The colors of the points represent
their ground truth labels.
(a) Before Attack (b) After attack
Figure 8.2: t-SNE plots showing the model’s predictions before and after a model attack which caused the model to
misclassify an image of a “5” as a “3”. The images for which the model’s prediction changes are denoted by large 6s.
(a) Before Attack (b) After attack
Figure 8.3: t-SNE plots showing the model’s predictions before and after a model attack which caused the model to
misclassify an image of a “4” as a “7”. The images for which the model’s prediction changes are denoted by large 6s.
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Figure 8.4: The images in the CIFAR-10 training set have been visualized using t-SNE. The colors of the points
represent their ground truth labels.
(a) Before Attack (b) After attack
Figure 8.5: t-SNE plots showing the model’s predictions before and after a model attack which caused the model to
misclassify an image of a “frog” as a “truck”. The images for which the model’s prediction changes are denoted by
large 6s.
(a) Before Attack (b) After attack
Figure 8.6: t-SNE plots showing the model’s predictions before and after a model attack which caused the model to
misclassify an image of a “deer” as a “cat”. The images for which the model’s prediction changes are denoted by large
6s.
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9. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
In this study, we have analyzed the threat of a model attack when the CNN model parameters
are stored in non-volatile memories where noise is inevitable. We have demonstrated that the
model attack can be carried out on a CNN model with minimal changes to the model’s parameters
and performance, which makes such an attack hard to detect. This raises concerns for practical
applications such as the self-driving car where the passengers’ safety could be at risk if the model
is compromised.
We studied the properties of the model-attack noise values and observed that they had a higher
kurtosis value when compared to Gaussian noise. Based on this observation, we devised a strategy
to detect the model attack in the presence of Gaussian random noise. We found that this strategy
works well when the variance of Gaussian noise is low.
We have discussed the different techniques that we used to study how the model attack affects
the model’s parameters and predictions. We observed that the Bit error rates in the model weights
due to the presence of model-attack noise are similar to those expected due to the presence of
Gaussian random noise. We observed that a t-SNE plot of model-attack noise has more structure
compared to a t-SNE plot of Gaussian random noise. We also analyzed the model’s predictions
before and after the attack and found that the model’s predictions for most of the images remain
unchanged. This shows that our attack strategy only has a minimal effect on the model’s perfor-
mance.
We defined the model attack problem by viewing it as the dual of the data attack problem and
proposed the “Loss function based model attack strategy” to solve it. Our research focuses on
this specific strategy to carry out the model attack, so further research is needed to understand
the general characteristics of the model attack problem. Future work can focus on identifying
alternate ways of compromising the model and strategies to detect the attacks. This would enable
us to devise robust practical strategies to defend against the threat of the model attack.
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